FERNANDO TOLA and CARMEN DRAGONETTI*

DIGNĀGA'S ĀLAMBANAPARĪKṢĀVṚTTI

The *Ālambanaparīkṣā* is one of the most important texts of Dignāga. This work and Vasubandhu's *Viṃśatikā*[1] and *Triṃśikā* are basic fundamental texts of the Yogācāra school of Buddhism; in them we find expounded the principal philosophical tenets of the school, centered around the thesis of the sole existence of consciousness, the thesis of "being as consciousness".[2]

EDITIONS AND/OR TRANSLATIONS OF THE *ĀLAMABANAPARĪKṢĀ* AND OF ITS COMMENTARIES

The small treatise *Ālambanaparīkṣā*, which contains 8 *kārikās* and their *vṛtti*, both composed by Dignāga, has not been preserved in Sanskrit. There is a Tibetan translation of the *kārikās* and another of the *vṛtti: Tōhoku* 4205 (*kārikās*) and 4206 (*vṛtti*) = *Catalogue* 5703 and 5704. There are also two Chinese translations of the *kārikās* with the *vṛtti: Taisho*, 1619 and 1624 (cf. Nanjio, 1172 and 1173; *Hōbōgirin, Fascicule Annexe*, p. 96).

Besides Dignāga's commentary two more commentaries have been preserved: one by Dharmapāla, incomplete and only in its Chinese version: *Taisho*, 1625 (cf. Nanjio, 1174, *Hōbōgirin, Fascicule Annexe*, p. 96) and another by Vinītadeva, complete and only in its Tibetan version: *Tōhoku* 4241 = *Catalogue* 5739.

There are several modern editions and translations of this treatise and its commentaries. We mention some of them:

S. Yamaguchi, 'Dignāga, Examen de l'objet de la connaissance. (Ālambanaparīkṣā) Textes Tibêtain et Chinois et traduction des stances et du commentaire. Éclaircissements et notes d'après le commentaire tibêtain de Vinītadeva', par . . . , en collaboration avec Henriette Meyer, *Journal Asiatique*, Janvier–Mars 1929, pp. 1–65.

E. Frauwallner, 'Dignāgas Ālambanaparīkṣā. Text, Übersetzung und Erläuterungen', *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Morgenlandes* 37 (1930), pp. 174–194. It includes the Tibetan text of the treatise together with a German translation and an exposition of its contents.

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M. Schott, *Sein als Bewusstsein. Ein Beitrag zur Mahāyāna-Philosophie*. Carl Winters (Materialien zur Kunde des Buddhismus, 20. Heft), Heidelberg 1935. In its second part: B. *Ālambanaparīkṣāśāstravyākhyā*, it contains a German translation from the incomplete Chinese version of Dharmapāla's commentary, in which there are included the *kārikās* of Dignāga's treatise.

N. Aiyaswami Sastri, *Ālambanaparīkṣā and Vṛtti by Diṅnāga. With the Commentary of Dharmapāla*. Restored into Sanskrit from the Tibetan and Chinese Versions and edited with English Translations and Notes and with copious extracts from Vinītadeva's Commentary. The Adyar Library, Adyar-Madras, 1942.

S. Yamaguchi and J. Nozawa, *Seshin Yuishiki no Genten Kaimei* (Textual Studies of Vasubandhu's Treatises on Vijñaptimātratā). Kyoto 1953, pp. 409–484. It includes the Japanese translation of the treatise (*kārikās* and *vṛtti*) and of Vinītadeva's commentary, and, as an appendix, the Tibetan text and a reconstruction of the Sanskrit original text.

H. Ui, *Jinna Chosaku no Kenkyū* (Studies on Dignāga's works). Tokyo 1958, pp. 24–130. It includes the annotated Japanese translation of the two Chinese versions of Dignāga's *kārikās* and of Dharmapāla's commentary, together with an extensive study.

E. Frauwallner, 'Dignāga, sein Werk und seiner Entwicklung', *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ost- Asiens und Archiv für indische Philosophie* 3 (1959), pp. 83–164. It comprises the Sanskrit or Tibetan text of some minor works of Dignāga, among which there is the *Ālambanaparīkṣā* (pp. 157–161): the Tibetan text with some Sanskrit fragments of the *kārikās* and *vṛtti* of Dignāga; and an important study of the evolution of Dignāga's thought.

A. Wayman, 'Yogācāra and the Buddhist logicians', *The Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies*, Vol. 2 No. 1 (1979), pp. 65–78. In pages 68–69 it has an English translation of the *kārikās*.

SOME FRAGMENTS OF THE *ĀLAMBANAPARĪKṢĀ* PRESERVED IN SANSKRIT, IN QUOTATIONS BY OTHER AUTHORS

Kārikā 1*a–d*. Kamalaśīla, *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā* II, p. 711 (ed. Bauddha Bharati Series-2, Varanasi, 1968), with a small variant:

> *yady apīndriyavijñapter grāhyāṃśaḥ karaṇaṃ bhavet /*
> *atadābhatayā tasyā nākṣavad viṣayaḥ sa tu //*

Kārikā 6a–d. Kamalaśīla, *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā* II, p. 710 (quoted ed.):

yadantarjñeyarūpaṃ tu bahirvad avabhāsate /
so'rtho vijñānarūpatvāt tatpratyayatayāpi ca //

Kārikā 6a–b. Śaṅkara, *Bhāṣya* of the *Brahmasūtras*, p. 548, line 9 (ed. Nirṇaya Sāgar Press, Bombay, 1938):

yadantarjñeyarūpaṃ tad bahirvad avabhāsate /

Vṛtti (partial) of kārikā 7b. Kamalaśīla, *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā* II, p. 710 (quoted ed.):

atha vā śaktyarpaṇāt krameṇāpi so'rthāvabhāsaḥ svānurūpakāryotpattaye śaktiṃ vijñānācārāṃ karotīty avirodhaḥ.

ADOPTED TEXT

For our translation we have adopted the text of the Tibetan translation of the *Sde-dge* edition of the *Tibetan Buddhist Canon: Bstan-ḥgyur, Tshad-ma*, Ce. 86a[5]–87b[2] (*Tōhoku* 4206). In some places, that we indicate in notes, we have, for clearness sake, preferred the readings either of the *Peking* edition: *Bstan-ḥgyur* Vol. 130, *Mdo-ḥgrel* (*Tshad-ma*) XCV, 73–2–5 up to 73–5–4, pp. 177b[5]–179a[4] (*Catalogue* 5704) or the readings of Vinītadeva's commentary, according to the *Sde-dge* edition: *Bstan-ḥgyur, Tshad-ma*, She. 175a[3] – 187b[5] (*Tōhoku* 4241) and/or *Peking* edition: *Bstan-ḥgyur* Vol. 138, *Mdo-ḥgrel* (*Tshad-ma*) CXII, 45–5–7 up to 51–4–7, pp. 183a[7]–197b[7] (*Catalogue* 5739).

The Tibetan title of the work is *Dmigs-pa brtag-paḥi ḥgrel pa* which corresponds exactly to the Sanskrit *Ālambanaparīkṣāvṛtti*.

The translation into Tibetan was done by the pandit Śāntākaragupta and the lotsava Tshul-khrims rgyal-mtshan. The Tibetan translation is excellent because of its clearness and conciseness; we perceive, only by reading it, that it is an extremely faithful version of the lost Sanskrit text; this impression is corroborated by the comparison of the fragments preserved in Sanskrit with the corresponding parts of it.

DOCTRINARY CONTENTS OF THE ĀLAMBANAPARĪKṢĀ

Preliminary Observations

Let us begin indicating that Dignāga himself gives in the paragraph 2 the definition of the cognition's 'object' (*viṣaya, yul*), which appears in the *kārikā* I*c–d*; and that he gives in the paragraph 5 the definition of the cognition's 'support' (*ālambana, dmigs-pa*), which appears in the first paragraph.

The definition of the cognition's object is the following one: something is object of the cognition when (1) its own being[3] is grasped with certainty by the cognition, (2) because the cognition comes forth bearing the appearance[4] of that own being.

The definition of the cognition's support is the following one: something is the cognition's support when (1) that thing produces a cognition, (2) which bears the representation of that thing. In this way that thing is the determining condition of the cognition.

Both terms indicate very similar concepts. In both definitions we find the agreement between the thing, to which the cognition refers, and the representation which is produced in the mind.

Any thing, whose own being is not grasped, as it happens with the atoms (see Section B, in the treatise and in our commentary), and any inexistent thing, to which we cannot attribute an own being that can be grasped, as it happens with the second moon (see Section C), both cannot be cognition's objects.

And whatever cannot be a cognition's object, cannot be its support. In the case of the atoms, because there is no agreement between the thing and the representation in the mind (agreement that theoretically is possible). In the case of the second moon, because it is not possible that there be an agreement between an inexistent thing and the mind's representation and also because an inexistent thing cannot be a cause of knowledge. See the paragraphs 3 and 7 of the treatise and our commentary thereon.

Section A: Paragraph 1

The paragraph 1 expresses the realistic position of the atomists, hindus or buddhists:[5] there are external objects which act as support for the sensorial cognition. According to this realistic position the support must be either the atoms or the conglomerates or aggregates formed by those atoms.

Section B: Kārikā Ia–d and Paragraphs 2–3

This section refers to the first alternative.

The paragraph 2 contains the definition of the cognition's object, which we have given in the *Preliminary observations* of our commentary.

Dignāga accepts, in the *kārikā* Ia–*b* and in the paragraph 3, that the atoms can be the cause of the sensorial cognition, considering that a cognitive act or process originates in the mind of a person only because the atoms are in front of him. If in front of that person there were no atoms, there could not be things, that are objects of knowledge, and no knowledge could be produced. The atoms are in this way a determining condition of the cognition, in the same way as the sense-organs are, the sense organs without which there could not be a cognitive act or process. But the atoms are not the object of the cognition because of the reasons that are formulated in *kārikā* Ic–*d* and in paragraph 3.

Kārikā Ic–*d* expresses that the atoms are not the cognition's object, because the representation that is produced in the mind does not correspond to the own being of the atoms. The atoms are not perceived, they are not the object of the knowledge, although this one is originated through the concealed presence (we can say) of the atoms. They collaborate as a cause in the birth of the cognition, in the same way as the sense organs, which nevertheless are not the objects of the cognition.

Paragraph 3 expresses that the atoms do not agree with the definition of knowledge's object ('there are not so'), of course because of the fact indicated in *kārikā* 1*c*–*d* referred in the previous paragraph.

Paragraph 3 ends indicating that the atoms cannot be the cognition's support. And this is right, because something that cannot be object of a cognition cannot be support of the same, as we have already said in the *Preliminary observations* of this commentary.

Section C: Kārikā IIa–b and Paragraphs 4–7

In the paragraphs 4–7 and in *kārikā* II*a*–*b* Dignāga examines the second alternative which considers the conglomerates or aggregates of atoms as the cognition's support.

Dignāga gives in paragraph 5 the definition of support, to which we have referred in the *Preliminary observations* of this commentary.

The conglomerate fulfills only the second of the two requirements of the definition, since, in the conglomerate's case, the cognition bears the representation of a conglomerate (paragraph 4 and *kārikā* II at the end), but does not comply with the first requirement. In fact, the cognition of a conglomerate does not proceed from a conglomerate (*kārikā* II*a*); a conglomerate is not the cause of the conglomerate's cognition (paragraph 7 at the end), simply because a conglomerate does not exist (*kārikā* II*b* and paragraph 7 at the end),[6] and we must understand that something that is inexistent cannot be the cause of anything else.

In *kārikā* II*b* and in the paragraph 7 Dignāga presents, as a case similar to the conglomerate's one, the case of the second moon which is perceived, instead of a single moon, owing to a defect of the eyes, and he explains that it cannot be the object of the cognition. Although the present section takes into account the notion of '*support*', nevertheless Dignāga expresses that the second moon cannot be the *object* of the cognition. As we have already indicated in the *Preliminary observations* of this commentary, the second moon cannot be the cognition's support not only because it is not the object of the cognition (since it has not an own being that can be grasped), but also because something inexistent, as it is, cannot be the cause of anything else.

Another example will make clearer Dignāga's thought. I see a compact and dark mass, a forest, because my vision has not sufficient power to penetrate up to the trees, trunks, branches and leaves, which are the only (relatively) real thing in this case and which are what I perceive under the appearance of a compact and dark mass. The compact and dark mass does not exist as such; I perceive it only owing to a deficiency, a weakness of my vision. The same thing happens with the conglomerate formed by atoms. The real thing in this case are the atoms; the conglomerate is only a construction of my mind, something unreal, due to the deficiency, the weakness of my sight, which cannot reach up to the atoms.

Section D: Kārikā IIc–d and Paragraph 8

This section presents the conclusion that has been reached up to now: nothing external can be the object of the perception; neither the atoms nor the conglomerate can be "support" of the cognition, because they do not fulfill the two requirements indicated by the definitions of the terms 'object' and 'support'; each one fulfills only one of the two requirements. In effect,

the atom can be the cognition's remote cause, but the cognition does not bear the representation of an atom; and as to the conglomerate, although in the mind a conglomerate's representation is formed, nevertheless a conglomerate is not the cause of that cognition, because it does not exist.

Section E: Kārikās IIIa–d and IVa–b and Paragraphs 9–12

In the *kārikā* III*a–d* and in the paragraphs 9–11 a third thesis is presented in order to save the conglomerate as the cognition's object. This thesis affirms that the atoms possess the 'nature of cause': that is to say: the capacity to produce a cognition that bears "the representation not of themselves, but of a conglomerate" (paragraph 10). Since the only thing that really exists are the atoms and we cannot accept the existence of the conglomeates formed by them, the capacity to give rise to a cognition that bears the representation of a conglomerate is attributed not to the conglomerates (because they are inexistent) but to the atoms that exist. Consequently we must understand that, when the *kārikā* III*a–b* refers to 'the forms of conglomerate', presenting them as the efficient cause of a conglomerate's cognition, it is referring to the conglomerate's forms that belong to the atom.

Those who sustain the thesis that the atom possesses the indicated capacity, argue that all the objects, including of course the atom itself, possess several forms, that is to say: several forms of manifesting themselves, several aspects under which they present themselves to us (paragraph 9). We grasp one or another of those forms. For instance the solidity of something, even if it exists, is not an object of the visual perception (paragraph 11), which on the contrary grasps other forms or aspects of that thing. There is no contradiction, consequently, between the fact that the conglomerate's form, under which it can manifest itself, is grasped and the fact that its atomicity (i.e. its infinitely spheric small form) is not grasped. When *kārikā* III*c–d* refers to the atoms form, it is referring to the atom's atomicity, as we see by paragraph 11.

According to the objector the atom would have among its forms of manifestation, first, its 'atomicity', its spheric infinitely small form, and secondly its conglomerate's form, which allows it to produce a conglomerate's representation in the mind. The atom in itself, isolated, cannot be grasped because of its infinitely small size; in other words, its 'atomicity', which is one of its aspects, is not perceptible, even if it exists; in other conditions, as

for instance if we had a more powerful sight, the atom could be an object of visual perception. Something similar happens with the conglomerate's form of the atom, which is another of its aspects of manifestation: normally, when the atom is isolated, this conglomerate's form is not perceived; in order that it be, it is necessary some special conditions: the atoms must be united, connected and then and only then the atom appears under its conglomerate's form and produces in the mind a conglomerate's representation.

We can therefore think according to the indicated arguments that the atom is the cognition's support, because it is something which produces a cognition that bears the representation of one of its forms of manifestation, of one of the aspects under which it can be presented to us.

In *kārikā* IV*a–b* and in paragraph 12 Dignāga refutes the previous thesis. He only says that, even if the atoms have really the capacity to produce a conglomerate's representation in the mind, nevertheless there would not be a representation of a cup, and another of a vessel. Since the atoms, notwithstanding their number, are all identical between them, they would produce in all the cases the representation of the same conglomerate, without the specific differences, as those which distinguish a vessel from a cup. Atoms would produce the representation of a conglomerate and nothing else.

Section F: Kārikā IVc–d and Va–b and Paragraphs 13–15

In the *kārikā* IV*c*, completed by the paragraph 13 of the commentary, we have a new position in defence of realism. According to this position there is a difference in the perceptions of a vessel or of a cup etc., because between the vessel and the cup etc. there is a difference, which originates in the differences of the respective forms of each part of the vessel, cup etc., as the neck, the basis etc. In other words the differences of the parts produce the differences of the objects and these last produce different perceptions.

It is necessary to understand that the differences of the parts (which produce the objects' differences and, as a consequence of these, the perceptions' differences) are originated in *something* that has nothing to do with the atoms. Effectively, it is the different location, position or situation (*saṃsthāna*) of the atoms that produce the differences of the parts. When the atoms are located in some way, they produce the square form of the vessel's basis, when they are located in another way, they produce the round

form of the vessel's body, and when they are located in a third way they produce the long form of the vessel's neck, and the same thing for the cup's forms.

With this explanation the objector tries to annul Dignāga's objection that the conglomerates' representations that would originate in the mind, would be all the same. The atoms could have the capacity to produce *in genere* conglomerates' representations; the atoms' location would allow the production of *in specie* conglomerates' representations: a cup-conglomerate, a vessel-conglomerate etc.

In the last line of paragraph 13, in the *kārikās* IV*d* and V*a–b* and in the paragraphs 14–15, Dignāga refutes the previous explanation expressing that we can admit that there are differences between a vessel and a cup etc., and that these differences are produced by the differences of their parts, but nevertheless these differences do not exist in the atoms, which are the real entities (according to the atomistic thesis), because all the atoms are spheric and there is not diversity among them; these differences exist only in the vessel, in the cup etc., which exist only by human convention.

The right, curved, or wavy surface or line etc., which distinguish the parts of the vessel, the cup etc., are not found in the atoms, since they have all the same form, even if they are constituted by different matter (earth, fire etc.); they are found in the objects themselves which are unreal, which exist only by convention, as Dignāga will explain in the next paragraph. Another example will make clearer Dignāga's thought: with identical and square bricks we can build walls that have right, curved or wavy surfaces or lines; these surfaces or lines are not in the bricks but in the walls built with them.

Section G: Kārikā Vc–d and Paragraph 16–17

Kārikā V*c–d* and paragraph 17 explain why the vessel, the cup etc. exist only by convention: if we eliminate the atoms, the cognition of the vessel, the cup etc. comes to an end. What is conventional depends on its parts, is conditioned by them, does not exist without them.[7] On the contrary, says paragraph 17, the cognition of something really existent does not end, even if we eliminate anything that is connected with it,[8] for instance the color etc., in other words even if we eliminate all attributes, qualities etc. that inhere in it.

Section H: Paragraph 18

Dignāga concludes manifesting in paragraph 18 that thus all the objects of sensorial perception do not exist outside the cognition's subject.

In this way ends the first part of the treatise, which aims at refuting realism, showing the impossibility that something external be the cognition's object.

In the *kārikās* VI, VII, and VIII and their respective commentaries (paragraphs 19–28), Dignāga will explain his own idealist thesis and will show how cognition is produced with absolute absence of an external object, only by the internal dynamism of consciousness. Dignāga's explanations fills the void left by the rejection of the realist thesis.

Section I: Kārikā VIa–d and Paragraphs 19–20

Kārikā VI*a–d* and paragraphs 19–20 expound the mechanism of the cognitive act according to Dignāga. We have in our mind representations of a world that appears to us as external and that we consider as real. These representations include visual sensations (images: form and colour), taste, smell, acustic and tact sensations. Dignāga, *kārikā* VI*a–d* calls these representations the 'knowable internal forms'.[9] Let us reflect upon what happens during the sleep: we have oniric representations (visual sensations etc.) to which nothing corresponds outside. These representations are also 'knowable internal forms'.

For Dignāga the representations that happen during the state that we call wakeful are of the same nature and characteristics as those produced during the sleep. In Section M we shall see which is the mechanism which produces in our mind those knowable internal forms which appear during our wakeful hours, even if there is not an object corresponding to them.

This knowable internal form is the cognition's object (*kārikā* VI*a–c*), its determining condition, its support (paragraph 19) since it fulfills the two requirements indicated by the definition of cognition's support given in paragraph 5: the cognition comes forth having as its contents that knowable internal form, bearing its representation (*kārikā* VI*c–d* and paragraph 20) and comes forth having it as its cause.

Section J: Kārikā VIIa–b and Paragraph 21–23

Paragraph 21 adduces an objection attributed to a realist objector: the

knowable internal form cannot be the determining condition of the cognition, since it is a part of the cognition, a part which does not exist before the cognition is produced and which comes forth together with the cognition.

Kārikā VII*a–b* and paragraph 20–23 refute this objection adopting two alternatives: the first one considers the *simultaneous* birth of the knowable internal form and of the cognition; the second one considers the *consecutive* birth firstly of the knowable interior form and secondly of the cognition.

With reference to the first alternative, Dignāga (*kārikā* VII*a* and paragraph 22) says that there is no difficulty to accept that the knowable interior form (which is the determining condition of the cognition) be born together with that cognition, since, according to logicians, the characteristic of the relation cause-effect is 'the concomitance of being and not-being',[10] even if the cause comes forth in the first place and the effect in the second place (as it is the case with the second alternative which will be dealt with afterwards). The meaning of this expression is the following one: if the cause exists, the effect also exists; if the cause does not exist, the effect does not exist. We find this necessary dependence even in our present case: if the knowable interior form exists, there is cognition; if the knowable interior form does not exist, there is no cognition.

Then Dignāga, in *kārikā* VII*b* and in the paragraph 23, occupies himself with the second alternative: the consecutive birth firstly of the knowable interior form, which is the cause, and then of the cognition which is the effect. Dignāga expresses that in this case also there is no difficulty, because the representation of any object leaves in the consciousness a virtuality, a 'seed', which produces (as the cause) the birth of another similar representation (as the effect).

To understand paragraph 23, it is necessary to make a reference to the theory of the *vāsanās* (this term literally means: 'impregnation by a scent') or of the *bījas* ("seeds").[11] According to this theory (which is accepted both by Buddhists and Hinduists and which reminds us of the modern theory of the sub-consciousness) every experience, as for instance a representation, leaves after itself in the consciousness (in the sub-consciousness) a trace, a mark, in other words a virtuality as Dignāga says. This virtuality when the appropriate conditions are given, actualizes itself giving rise to a new similar representation.

Let us add to this explanation that the representation's object has not to be necessarily an external object, an object really existent. It can be, and for the *Yogācāras* it is always an internal object, an illusory object, that is a mere mental creation. The representation of this illusory object leaves also a

virtuality from which comes forth a new representation similar to the previous one. It is not necessary to require that the representations' object of the series representation-virtuality-representation etc. be real objects. For the *Yogācāras* the only thing that has existed are representations of unreal objects which left virtualities which at their turn gave birth to new representations of unreal objects. And this process comes from a beginningless eternity. See Section M.

When the text speaks of the consecutive birth, we must understand, as it is seen by the preceding explanation, that it is referring to the consecutive birth, at a first time, of the virtuality (which contains in itself, in a latent, potential state, the knowable interior form, which is the contents of the cognition which comes forth) and, at a second time, of the cognition (which is the effect of the actualization of that virtuality). It is possible to say that the knowable interior form, which exists in a virtual state in the consciousness from the moment that the previous representation is produced, precedes the cognition whose object it (the knowable interior form) is.

We have said before that Dignāga conceives the knowable interior forms as the dream images. Let us add now (using the same analogy of the dream) that in the same form as many dream images originate in the dreamer's mind owing to the reactivation of the impressions which he had during his vigil hours, so also the knowable interior forms come forth as an actualization of the marks (which Dignāga calls 'virtualities') impressed in the consciousness during the previous experiences. The only difference between both processes is that the impressions that are reactualized during sleep have as their limit *a quo* one own's birth, while the virtualities referred to by Dignāga come from the previous lives, in function of the Indian postulate of the reincarnation.

Section K: Kārikā VIIc–d and Paragraph 24–25

In paragraph 24 Dignāga presents the following objection: if only the (knowable) interior form[12] is the determining condition, the support of cognition, how it is possible that visual cognition (or any other sensorial cognition) be born depending on the interior form (visual sensations etc.) and the eye (or any other sense-organ)? The Buddhist theory of knowledge taught that visual cognition etc. are produced depending on the object, the eye etc.[13] If there is only the knowable interior form, which can be grasped solely by mind, the consequence is that the eye etc. have no function to

fulfill in the cognition process. The Buddhist theory referred before, generally accepted, is thus left aside.

Dignāga answers this objection in the *kārikā* VII*c–d* and in paragraph 25 manifesting that the senses are only collaborating faculties; that from their effect it can be concluded that they are the form of the virtuality and that they are not composed by material elements.

We must understand these affirmations of Dignāga in the following way. The senses are not material entities, but only powers, faculties which collaborate, together with the cognition's object, in the production of the cognitive act. From the effect produced by the senses, i.e. from the sensorial cognition, we cannot infer necessarily that the senses are something composed by material elements. The only thing that we can conclude is that they are the form of the virtuality. Effectively, as we have said, every representation leaves in the consciousness a virtuality which produces a new representation similar to the previous one. These virtualities must have different forms, they must belong to different classes. The virtuality left by a representation produced by a visual perception will be different from the virtuality produced by an auditive perception and so on in relation with each one of the other senses. From a generic point of view all will be virtualities; from a specific point of view one virtuality will be visual virtuality, another will be auditive virtuality and so on. The visual virtuality will actualize itself producing a visual cognition, the auditive virtuality will actualize itself producing an auditive cognition and so on

If all the representations leave only *in abstracto, in genere* virtualities, then, when they are reactualized, they would produce only *in abstracto, in genere* cognitions, nothing else, without the visual, auditive etc. especification. But when a cognitive act is produced, it presents itself as visual, auditive etc. and never *in abstracto*. If we do not accept the division of virtualities into visual virtualities etc., we could not explain how from identical virtualities we have different cognitions. But if we accept that the virtualities left by previous representations are visual, auditive etc., then we understand that the cognitions, which they produce, are visual, auditive etc.

For Dignāga, according to what has been said, the forms of the virtualities are the senses.

Section L: Kārikā VIIIa and Paragraph 26

In the *kārikā* VIII*a* and in the paragraph 26 Dignāga expresses that the

virtuality left by a previous representation can rest, i.e. subsist in a latent form, either in the consciousness or in its own indefinable own form,[14] but that in any case there would not be difference in relation to the effect produced by the virtuality.[15] That virtuality, subsisting either in the consciousness or in its own form, produces, reactualizing itself, a new cognition's act. Wherever it rest, the effect will be the same.

Dignāga does not say anything else about the "place" where the virtuality is kept, because in this treatise his sole interest is to demonstrate that the cognition's process is produced without the intervention of something external, that the cognition's act comes forth from absolutely internal elements.

Section M: Kārikā VIIIb–d and Paragraph 27–28

In *kārikā* VIII*b–d* and in paragraph 27 Dignāga indicates the relation between the object's form and the virtuality.

The commentary begins expressing that the cognition is produced depending on the virtuality called 'eye' and on the interior form. With the expression 'virtuality called "eye"' Dignāga refers to the virtuality left by a previous representation of the object, about which he has treated in a general way in *kārikā* VII*b* and in paragraph 23. Now Dignāga designates it with the expression 'virtuality called "eye"' (or ear or any other sense organ), because (as it has been said in paragraphs 24–25) that virtuality actualizes itself only under the form of any one of the sensorial cognitions. This is the first requirement on which depends that cognition's production.

The second requirement is the knowable interior form, which in VIII*b–d* is designated with the words 'object's form' and in the commentary's beginning with the expression 'interior form'. As it has been said previously (see Section I and J of this commentary) the knowable interior form is the (unavoidable) object of the act of cognition – the cognition unto which is transformed the (visual, auditive etc.) virtuality left by a previous representation.

So we have (1) a virtuality that actualizes itself as a cognition; (2) this cognition can be visual, auditive etc. (this is the equivalent element of the senses); (3) this cognition has necessarily an object and (4) this object is the knowable interior form (this is the equivalent element of the external object).

The knowable interior form is a part of the cognition's act, it comes forth necessarily with the cognition's act and it is also its cause.

Dignāga says moreover that the cognition is born 'not produced'[16] by a support, that is to say: not produced by an *external* support.

The virtuality (visual etc.) and the form of the knowable interior object (the two causes of the knowledge's production) are mutually caused and are beginningless[17] (*kārikā* VIII*b–d* and the second and third phrases of paragraph 27). As we have already said (Section J) the representation of an object (which is nothing else than a simple mental creation) leaves in the consciousness (or wherever it may be) a virtuality and owing to this virtuality, when it is reactualized, we have a new representation of a similar object. So there is a series representation-virtuality-representation etc. which has not had a temporal beginning. If the series had begun with a representation, the question 'how has been produced that representation?' would remain without answer, since we do not accept the existence of a real, external object that could produce it. If the series had begun with a virtuality, the question 'how has been produced that virtuality?' would similarly remain without answer, since we do not accept the existence of a previous representation.

The virtuality and the interior form (of the object) can be considered as different and as not different from the cognition according to the point of view in which we place ourselves. From the point of view of the philosophical analysis, in which Dignāga places himself, we can distinguish the different elements that constitute the cognition's process: a virtuality left by a previous representation, the cognition's act that comes forth from that virtuality and the cognition's object, similar to the object of the previous representation. But rigorously there is no difference between these three factors: the cognition is nothing else than the reactualized virtuality and the knowable interior form is nothing else than the manner the virtuality manifests itself. These three factors are only aspects, froms, parts (individualized only in theory through the conceptual analysis) of one indivisible, undivided entity: consciousness.

Dignāga concludes the treatise expressing that the interior support is the cognition's object, that is to say that the knowable interior form, which produces the cognition and under whose appearance the cognition comes forth, is the cognition's object.

TIBETAN TEXT

DMIGS PA BRTAG PAḤI ḤGREL PA

rgya gar skad du / ālambanaparīkśābṛtti /
bod skad du / dmigs pa brtag paḥi ḥgrel pa /

saṅs rgyas daṅ byaṅ chub sems dpaḥ thams cad la phyag ḥtshal lo /

gaṅ dag mig la sogs paḥi rnam par śes paḥi dmigs pa phyi rol gyi don yin par ḥdod pa de dag ni deḥi rgyu yin paḥi phyir rdul phra rab dag yin pa ḥam der snaṅ baḥi śes pa skye baḥi phyir de ḥdus pa yin par rtog graṅ na / de la re źig

dbaṅ po rnam par rig paḥi rgyu /
phra rab rdul dag yin mod kyi /
der mi snaṅ phyir deḥi yul[18] ni /
rdul phran ma yin dbaṅ po bźin //1//

yul źes bya ba ni śes pas[19] raṅ gi ṅo bo ṅes par ḥdsin pa yin te deḥi rnam par skye baḥi phyir ro / rdul phra mo dag ni[20] deḥi rgyu ñid yin du zin kyaṅ de lta ma yin te dbaṅ po bźin no / de ltar na re źig rdul phra mo dag dmigs pa ma yin no / ḥdus pa ni der snaṅ ba ñid yin du zin kyaṅ /

gaṅ ltar snaṅ de de las min /

don gaṅ źig raṅ snaṅ baḥi rnam par rig pa bskyed pa de ni dmigs pa yin par rigs te / ḥdi ltar de ni skye baḥi rkyen ñid du bśad pas so / ḥdus pa ni de lta yaṅ ma yin te /

rdsas su med phyir zla gñis bźin /

dbaṅ po ma tshaṅ baḥi phyir zla ba gñis mthoṅ ba ni der snaṅ ba ñid yin du zin kyaṅ deḥi yul ma yin no / de bźin du rdsas su yod pa ma yin pa ñid kyis rgyu ma yin paḥi phyir ḥdus pa dmigs pa ma yin no /

de ltar phyi rol gñis kar yaṅ /
blo yi yul du mi ruṅ ṅo //2//

yan lag gcig ma tshaṅ baḥi phyir phyi rol gyi rdul phra mo daṅ tshogs pa źes bya baḥi don ni dmigs pa ma yin no / ḥdi la ni /

kha cig ḥdus paḥi rnam pa dag /
sgrub pa yin par ḥdod par byed /

don thams cad ni rnam pa du ma can yin pas de la rnam pa ḥgaḥ źig gis mṅon sum ñid du hdod do / rdul phra rab rnams la yaṅ ḥdus par snaṅ baḥi śes pa skyed paḥi rgyuḥi dṅos po[21] yod do /

rdul phran rnam pa rnam rig gi /
don min sra ñid la sogs bźin //3//

ji ltar sra ñid la sogs pa ni yod bźin du yaṅ mig gi bloḥi yul ma yin pa ltar rdul phra mo ñid kyaṅ de daṅ ḥdraḥo /

de dag ltar na bum pa daṅ /
kham phor sogs blo mtshuṅs par ḥgyur /

bum pa daṅ kham phor la sogs paḥi rdul phra mo rnams la ni maṅ du zin kyaṅ khyad par ḥgaḥ yaṅ med do /

gal te rnam paḥi dbye bas dbye /

gal te ḥdi sñam du mgrin pa la sogs paḥi rnam paḥi khyad par las gaṅ gis ni bloḥi khyad par du ḥgyur baḥi khyad par yod do sñam du sems na khyad par ḥdi ni bum pa la sogs pa la yod kyi /

de ni rdul phran rdsas yod la //4//
med de tshad dbye med phyir ro /

rdul phra rab rnams ni rdsas gźan yin du zin kyaṅ zlum po la ni dbye ba med do /

de phyir de rdsas med la yod /

rnam paḥi dbye ba ni kun rdsob tu yod pa dag kho na la yod kyi rdul phra mo rnams la ma yin no / bum pa la sogs pa ni kun rdsob tu yod pa ñid do /

rdul phran yoṅs su bsal na ni /
der snaṅ śes pa ñams ḥgyur phyir //5//

rdsas su yod pa rnams la ni ḥbrel pa can bsal du zin kyaṅ kha dog la sogs pa bźin du raṅ gi blo ḥdor pa med do[22] / de lta bas na dbaṅ poḥi blo rnams kyi yul ni phyi rol na ma yin par ḥthad do /

naṅ gi śes byaḥi ṅo bo ni /
phyi rol ltar snaṅ gaṅ yin de /
don yin

phyi rol gyi don med bźin du phyi rol lta bur snaṅ ba naṅ na yod pa kho na dmigs paḥi rkyen yin no /

rnam śes ṅo boḥi phyir /
de rkyen ñid kyaṅ yin phyir ro //6//

naṅ gi rnam par śes pa ni don du snaṅ ba daṅ / de las skyes pa yin pas / chos ñid gñis daṅ ldan paḥi phyir naṅ na yod pa kho na dmigs paḥi rkyen yin no / re źig de ltar snaṅ ba ñid yin la reg na[23] / deḥi phyogs gcig po lhan cig skyes pa go ji ltar rkyen yin źe na /

gcig na ḥaṅ mi ḥkhrul phyir na rkyen /

lhan cig par gyur du zin kyaṅ ḥkhrul pa med paḥi phyir gźan las skye baḥi rkyen du ḥgyur te / ḥdi ltar gtan tshigs dag ni yod pa daṅ med pa dag gi de daṅ ldan pa ñid ni[24] rgyu daṅ rgyu daṅ ldan pa[25] rim gyis skye ba dag gi yaṅ mtshan ñid yin par smraḥo / yaṅ na

nus pa ḥjog phyir rim gyis yin /

rim gyis kyaṅ yin te / don du snaṅ ba[26] de ni raṅ snaṅ ba daṅ mthun paḥi ḥbras bu skyed par byed paḥi[27] nus pa / rnam par śes paḥi rten can byed pas mi ḥgal lo / gal te ḥo na ni naṅ gi gzugs kho na dmigs paḥi rkyen yin na / ji ltar de daṅ mig la brten nas[28] mig gi rnam par śes pa skye źe na /

lhan cig byed dbaṅ nus pa yi /
ṅo bo gaṅ yin dbaṅ po ḥaṅ yin //7//

dbaṅ po ni raṅ gi ḥbras bu las nus paḥi ṅo bo ñid du rjes su dpag gi ḥbyuṅ ba las gyur pa ñid du ni ma yin no /

de yaṅ rnam rig la mi ḥgal /

nus pa ni[29] rnam par śes pa la yod kyaṅ ruṅ / bstan du med paḥi raṅ gi ṅo bo la yod kyaṅ ruṅ ste / ḥbras bu skyed pa la khyad par med do /

de ltar yul gyi ṅo bo daṅ /
nus pa phan tshun rgyu can daṅ /
thog ma med dus[30] ḥjug pa yin //8//

mig ces bya baḥi nus pa daṅ / naṅ gi gzugs la brten nas rnam par śes pa don du snaṅ ba dmigs kyis ma phye ba[31] skyeḥo / ḥdi gñis kyaṅ phan tshun gyi rgyu can daṅ / thog ma med paḥi dus can yin te / res ḥgaḥ ni nus pa yoṅs su smin pa las rnam par śes pa[32] yul gyi rnam pa ñid du[33] ḥbyuṅ la res ḥgaḥ ni deḥi rnam pa las[34] nus paḥo / rnam par śes pa las de gñis gźan ñid daṅ gźan ma yin pa ñid du ci dgar brjod par byaḥo / de ltar naṅ gi dmigs pa ni chos ñid gñis daṅ ldan paḥi phyir yul ñid du ḥthad do[35] /

dmigs pa brtags paḥi ḥgrel pa slob dpon phyogs kyi glaṅ pos mdsad pa rdsogs so[36] /

TRANSLATION

INVESTIGATION ABOUT THE (COGNITION'S) SUPPORT

kārikās and *vṛtti*

by

Dignāga

In Sanskrit: *Ālambanaparīkṣāvṛtti*;
In Tibetan: *Dmigs pa brtag paḥi ḥgrel pa*.

I pay homage to all the *Buddhas* and *Bodhisattvas*.

Section A: Paragraph 1

(1) Those who postulate that the support of the cognition through the eye etc. is an external thing, consider that either the atoms are (the cognition's support) or that a conglomerate (of atoms) is (the cognition's support), because there arises a cognition which bears the representation of that (conglomerate).

Section B: Kārikā Ia–d and Paragraphs 2–3

Concerning that (thesis, the author says):

Ia–b *Even if the atoms are the cause of the cognition through the senses, since (the cognition) does not bear the representation of*

those (atoms), the atoms are not the object of that (cognition), in the same way as the sense-organs (are not the cognition's object).

(2) It is said (about something that it is) the cognition's object (when) its own being is grasped by the cognition, because (the cognition) arises (provided) with the form of that (own being).

(3) Concerning the atoms, even if they are the cause (of the cognition), they are not thus (as the cognition's object must be according to paragraph 2), in the same way as the sense-organs (are not the cognition's object).

Therefore no atom is the (cognition's) support.

Section C: Kārikā IIa–b and Paragraphs 4–7

(4) Concerning the conglomerate, even if (the cognition) bears its representation (i.e. = the representation of a conglomerate),

II*a* *that (cognition) does not arise from that whose representation it bears (i.e. does not arise from a conglomerate),*

(5) It is right (to consider) that any thing, which produces a cognition which bears its representation (i.e. the representation of that thing), is, only it, the cognition's support, because it has been taught that in this way it is the determining condition of the birth (of the cognition).

(6) Concerning the conglomerate neither it is thus (as the cognition's support must be, according to paragraph 5),

II*b* *because (the conglomerate) does not exist as something real, in the same way as a second moon (does not exist).*

(7) As regards the vision of a second moon owing to some defect in the senses, even if (the cognition) bears its representation (i.e. the representation of a second moon), it (i.e. the second moon) is not the object of that (cognition). In the same way an aggregate is not the (cognition's) support, because it is not the cause (of the cognition), since it does not exist as something real.

Section D: Kārikā IIc–d and Paragraph 8

II*c–d* *Thus, in both cases, (something) external cannot be the perception's object.*

(8) The external things that are called 'atoms' and 'conglomerate' are not the (cognition's) support, as a part (of the requirements necessary to be cognition's support) is missing.

Section E: Kārikā IIIa–d and IVa–b and Paragraphs 9–12

Concerning this (matter)

III*a–b* *some (masters) hold that the forms of the conglomerate are the efficient cause (of the cognition).*

(9) Some people hold that the things, because they are possessed of several forms, are perceptible under one or another of these forms.

(10) There exists also in the atoms the nature of cause, which produces a cognition which bears the representation of a conglomerate.

III*c–d* *The atom's form is not an object of the (visual) cognition, in the same way as the solidity (is not).*

(11) Just as the solidity etc. although they exist, are not an object of the eye's perception, so also the atomicity is like it (i.e. like the solidity, because, although it exists, it is not an object of the visual perception).

IV*a–b* *According to them (it would happen that) the perceptions of a pot, a cup etc. would be all the same.*

(12) Among the atoms of a pot, a cup etc., although they are very numerous, there is not any difference.

Section F: Kārikās IVc–d and Va–b and Paragraphs 13–15

IV*c* *If (it is held that) the diversity (between the pot, the cup etc.) is due to the diversity of the forms (which they possess),*

(13) (That is to say:) If some person thinks that, owing to the difference of the forms of the neck etc. (of the pot, the cup etc.), there exists a difference (between the pot and the cup etc. as wholes), which comes forth as a difference of the perception, (then we must answer that) the difference (of the pot, the cup etc. as wholes) exists (only) in the pot etc.,

IV*d* V*a* *but it (i.e. the difference) does not exist in the atoms, which (according to the opponent are the only thing that) exist as something real, because there is not in them any diversity of measure.*

(14) (Effectively) even if the atoms are real different matter, there is no difference (among them), because they are all of a spherical form.

V*b* *Therefore it (i.e. the difference between the pot, the cup etc. and in general between the things) exists (only) in those (things) which do not really exist,*

(15) The diversity of the forms does not exist in the atoms, even if it exists in those (things) which exist only by (human) convention.

Section G: Kārikā Vc–d and Paragraphs 16–17

(16) The pot etc. exist only by (human) convention,

V*c–d* *because, if the atoms are eliminated, the cognition, which bears its representation (i.e. the representation of the pot), ceases.*

(17) In relation to the things that really exist, even if one eliminates what is connected (with them), the perception which is (their) own is not eliminated.

Section H: Paragraph 18

(18) Therefore, the object of the perceptions through the senses does not exist externally.

Section I: Kārikā VIa–d and Paragraphs 19–20

VI*a–c* *The knowable interior form, which appears as external, is the object (of the cognition),*

(19) Even if an external object does not exist, what appears as (if it were) external, but exists only internally, (– that) is the determining condition, the (cognition's) support,

VI*c–d* *because it (the knowable interior form) is the form of the cognition and (also) because it is also its determining condition (i.e. of the cognition).*

(20) What exists only internally is the determining condition (of the cognition), the (cognition's) support, because it is provided with the two characteristics (indicated in paragraph 5), since the interior cognition bears the representation of that object (i.e. the knowable interior form) and comes forth through it.

Section J: Kārikā VIIa–b and Paragraphs 21–23

(21) If somebody asks: How can it be understood that, when (the interior cognition) happens to bear in the indicated way the representation (of the knowable interior form), (this knowable interior form which is only) a part of that (interior cognition and) which comes forth together (with that interior cognition) can be the determining condition (of that interior cognition)?, (we answer:)

VII*a* *Even if (the knowable interior form comes forth) together (with the interior cognition), it is the determining condition because of the necessary relation (between the knowable interior form and the interior cognition).*

(22) Even if (the knowable interior form) comes forth together (with the interior cognition), it happens to be the determining condition of what comes forth out of another, because there exists a necessary relation (between both). Then the logicians say that 'the concomitance of being and not being' is the essential characteristic of cause and effect, even if they have been born successively.

VII*b* *(Even if the knowable interior form and the cognition are born) successively (the knowable interior form) is (the determining condition of the cognition), because it leaves a virtuality.*

(23) There is neither contradiction even if (the knowable interior form and the interior cognition) come forth successively, because the representation of an object gives rise to a virtuality, which (at its own turn) produces the birth

of an effect (i.e. a new representation) similar to the representation (of the previous object) and which lies in the consciousness.

Section K: Kārikā VIIc–d and Paragraphs 24–25

(24) Now if it is asked: if only the (knowable) interior form is the determining condition, the (cognition's) support, how can the eye's cognition (i.e. the cognition through the eye) be born depending on that (knowable interior form) and on the eye?

(25) (We answer that) the senses do not exist as something constituted by elements, but taking into account their own effect one infers that they are the form (or aspect) of the virtuality.

Section L: Kārikā VIIIa and Paragraph 26

VIII*a* *Neither it is contradictory that this (virtuality lie) in the consciousness.*

(26) The virtuality either exists in the consciousness or exists in its own indefinable form; (in both cases) there is no difference in relation to the production of the effect.

Section M: Kārikā VIIIb–d and Paragraphs 27–28

VIII*b–d* *So the form of the object and the virtuality function mutually caused and since a beginningless time.*

(27) The cognition, depending on the virtuality (that is) called 'eye' and on the (knowable) interior form, comes forth bearing the representation of the object, (which is) not produced by an (external cognition's) support. These two (i.e. the form of the object or knowable interior form and the virtuality) are mutually caused and have no beginning in time. And the cognition comes forth from the virtuality fully matured under the form of an object and at its turn the virtuality (comes forth) from the form of that (object). Both (i.e. the form of the object or knowable interior form and the virtuality) must be considered, according to one's own will, either as different or as not different from the cognition.

(28) So we can admit that an internal support is the object (of the cognition), because it is endowed with the two characteristics (indicated in paragraphs 2 and 5).

The *Investigation about the (cognition's) support* composed by Ācārya Dignāga is finished.

Centro de Investigaciones Filosoficas, Buenos Aires
Seminario de Indologia

NOTES

* National Council for Scientific Research, Buenos Aires, Argentina.

1 C. Dragonetti is preparing a translation of this treatise.

2 Cf. M. Schott, *Sein als Bewusstsein. Ein Beitrag zur Mahāyāna-Philosophie*, Heidelberg: Carl Winters Universitätsbuchlandlung, 1935.

3 *Own being: raṅ gi ṅo bo* in the Tibetan original; *svarūpa, svabhāva* in Sanskrit. These words indicate the way of being of a thing, which is proper to it and which individualizes it, distinguishing it from others, its essential nature.

4 *Appearance: rnam pa* in the Tibetan original; it corresponds to Sanskrit *ākāra* which means 'form', 'figure', 'appearance', 'external aspect'. We have translated it by 'form'; we must understand by this word the appearance under which the own being of the thing, which is the object of knowledge, appears before the mind.

5 The atomic theory was the explanation of the world generally accepted in India in Dignāga's epoch. About Indian atomism see the relevant sections of the histories of Indian philosophy and also: B. Faddegon (1918). *The Vaiçeṣika-System, described with the help of the oldest texts*, Wiesbaden: M. Sändig, 1969; H. Jacobi (1909). 'Atomic theory' (Indian), J. Hastings, *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, Edinburg: T. & T. Clark, 1964, T. 2, pp. 199–202; A. B. Keith (1921). *Indian Logic and Atomism. An exposition of the Nyāya and Vaiçeṣika systems*, New York: Greenwood Press, 1968; H. Ui (1917). *The Vaiśeṣika Philosophy according to the Daśapadārtha-Śāstra. Chinese text with Introduction, translation and notes*, Varanasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1962 (The Chowkhamba Sanskrit Studies Vol. XXII); M. K. Gangopadhyaya, *Indian Atomism: History and Sources*, Calcutta: Bagchi Indological Series, 1, 1980; P. Masson-Oursel, "L'atomisme indien", *Revue Philosophique (de la France et de l'étranger)*, Paris, 99, 1925, pp. 342–368.

6 One of the most discuted questions in Indian philosophy was the question referring to the whole (*avayavin*) and the parts (*avayava*). It opposed specially, on one side, the *Nyāya* and the *Vaiśeṣika* schools and, on the other, the *Yogācāra* school. The *Nyāya* and the *Vaiśeṣika* affirmed that the whole exists and is something real and different from its parts. The Buddhists on their side affirmed that the whole does not exist, that it has no own reality and that only the parts have a (relatively) real existence.

The first Hinduist text that treats this subject is Gautama, *Nyāyasūtra* II, 1, 31–37 and II, 2, 4–17. In this text Gautama analyzes in first place, in order to refute it, the thesis of some authors which sustain that the perception is only an inference, since from grasping only a part we infer either the other parts or the other parts and the whole.

Then Gautama in the remaining *sūtras* defends the real existence of the whole against the Buddhist thesis which admits the (relatively) real existence of the parts. Cf. the sections, pertaining to Gautama's *sūtras*, of the *Bhāṣya* of Vātsyāyana, *Nyāyavārttika* of Uddyotokara and *Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā* of Vācaspati Miśra; Bhasarvajña, *Nyāyabhuśana*, pp. 104–112 (Swami Yogindrānanda ed., Varanasi, 1968); Śrīdhara, *Nyāyakandalī*, pp. 101–109 (Durgadhara Jha Sarma (ed.), Varanasi, 1963, Ganganatha Jha Granthamala etc.); Vyomaśiva, commentary (*ṭīkā*) on the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* of Praśastapāda, pp. 44–46 (Gopinath Kaviraj and Dandhirāja Sastri (ed.), Benares, 1924–1931, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series).

On the Buddhist side, in the *Milindapañha*, pp. 26–28 (V. Trenckner edition, London, P. T. S., 1962), Nāgasena explains to the Greek king Menander that the whole does not exist truly and that the only thing relatively real are the parts, employing the celebrated analogy of the car: the axle, the wheels, the helm really exist; 'car' is only a conventional denomination to which nothing real corresponds. As H. Oldenberg (1881). *Buddha.Sein Leben-Seine Lehre-Seine Gemeinde*, München: Wilhelm Goldmann, 1961, p. 241, observes, Nāgasena's thesis agrees with the most ancient Buddha's teachings, because the verses quoted by Nāgasena, which synthesize his views are from *Saṃyutta Nikāya* I, p. 135 (P. T. S. edition = I, p. 135 Nālandā Devanāgarī Pāli Series edition). Cf. Buddhaghosa, *Visuddhimagga* XVIII, paragraphs 25–28, pp. 508–509 (Warren edition, Cambridge Mass.: Harvard Oriental Series, 1950). The position that is maintained by the verses of the *Saṃyutta Nikāya* and by Nāgasena is followed by the authors that come after and is severely criticised by the Hinduist authors. See Paṇḍita Aśoka's *Avayavinirākaraṇa* in *Aśokanibandhau*, A. Thakur (ed.), Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, Patna, 1974; Śāntarakṣita, *Tattvasaṃgraha*, verses 555–620, Vol. I, pp. 234–255 (ed. Varanasi, Bauddha Bharati Series, 1968) and *ibidem* the corresponding part of the commentary *Pañjikā* of Kamalaśīla.

One can find in the indicated authors a broad argumentation employed in favour or against both thesis. The arguments developped by Dignāga against the existence of the conglomerate (i.e. against a really existing whole besides the parts that compose it) are only a fraction of that argumentation.

We have said that for the Buddhist the only thing *relatively* real are the parts. In effect the existence, which corresponds to the parts, is not an absolute one, but only a relative one, since the parts on their turn can be analysed into their respective parts and these into their constituting elements and so on in an analytical abolishing process which has no end, considering that the Buddhists do not accept the atom's existence. This is the position developped by the *Hastavālanāmaprakaraṇa's* author (Āryadeva or Dignāga). See F. Tola and C. Dragonetti, 'Nāgārjuna's Conception of "voidness" (Sūnyatā)', *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 9, No. 3, 1981, and 'The Hastavālanāmaprakaraṇavṛtti', *The Journal of Religious Studies*, Vol. VIII, Spring, 1980, No. 1, Punjabi University, Patiala (India), pp. 18–31. This position agrees with the non acceptation of the whole as something real.

The refusal of the real existence of the whole is a logical consequence of the Mahāyāna principle according to which anything that is conditionned (dependent, relative or composed) does not really exist.

See also S. Chatterjee (1939). *The Nyāya theory of knowledge. A critical study of some problems of Logic and Metaphysics*, Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1965, pp. 156–159; B. Faddegon, *The Vaiçeṣika system* (quoted in note 5), pp. 50–51, 371–375 (translation of the relevant text of the *Nyāyakandalī*); Y. Kajiyama, 'The

Avayavīnirākaraṇa of Pandita Aśoka', *Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies*, Tokyo 9, 1961, pp. 366–371; A. B. Keith, *Indian Logic and Atomism* (quoted in note 5), pp. 16, 23, 70, 183, 225; M. Müller (1899). *The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy*, Varanasi-1 (India): Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, New impression of the 1919 edition, p. 393; K. Potter (ed.), *The encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies* Vol. II, *Indian Metaphysics and Epistemology: The tradition of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika up to Gangeśa*, Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1977, pp. 74–79; S. Radhakrishnan (1923). *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, New York-London: The Macmillan Company-G. Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1962, pp. 187–188; B. K. Matilal, *Epistemology, Logic and Grammar in Indian Philosophical Analysis*, The Hague: Mouton, 1971, pp. 52–55; T. R. Saundararaman, 'Refutation of the Buddhist doctrine of aggregates', *Philosophical Quarterly*, Amalner 16, 1940–1941, pp. 164–171; J. Sinha, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, Calcutta (India): Sinha Publishing House, 1956, pp. 313–314; D. N. Shastri (1964). *The Philosophy of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and its Conflict with The Buddhist Dignāga School* (*Critique of Indian Realism*), Delhi-Varanasi: Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan, 1976, pp. 248–261; S. Bhaduri, *Studies in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Metaphysics*, Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1947, *Chapter XI: Whole and part*, pp. 229–270.

7 According to what has been expounded in the previous note Buddhism denied the whole's existence; it attributed to the whole a merely conventional existence. Accordingly for the Buddhist the things that compose the empirical reality are only conventional denominations, without anything real under them.

8 It must be observed that Dignāga says that the perception of what really exists does not cease even if we eliminate from it anything that is *connected* with it. He does not speak of *parts*, since, as we have already said, if something real exists, it cannot have parts.

9 The original text has the word *ṅo bo* which has two fundamental values: (1) 'thing' (= *vastu* in Sanskrit) and (2) 'form' (= *rūpa* in Sanskrit). We have translated it by the word 'form', as Frauwallner does. By this word we must understand the representations to which we have referred in the commentary.

10 For Dignāga, among the characteristics which define the cause-effect relation, the most important is the coincidence between the existence and not existence of the cause and the effect. It must be of course a necessary and obligatory coincidence: if A exists, necessarily B is produced; if A does not exist, necessarily B does not come into existence. For Dignāga both cause and effect can be simultaneous, as in the case of the knowable interior form and the cognition that it produces.

The coincidence of being and not being is mentionned by several logicians when they deal about the cause. Keśava Miśra, *Tarkabhāṣā*, p. 11 (S. R. Iyer (ed.), Varanasi-Delhi: Chaukhambha Orientalia, 1979), after giving the definition of the cause according to the *Nyāya* school (to which he belongs), he indicates that several authors define the cause as "*that whose presence and absence are imitated by the presence and absence of the effect*". Keśava Miśra does not accept this definition. Dharmottara, on commenting Dharmakīrti indicates that "*causality is a conception familiar in common life. It is known to be derived from experience (of the presence of the cause wherever there is an effect present), and from the negative experience (of the absence of the effect when the cause is deficient)*" (Th. Stcherbatsky's translation, in *Buddhist Logic*, Vol. II, p. 67, New York: Dover Publications, 1962, first published by the Academy of Sciences of the U. R. S. S., circa 1930). The notion of coincidence between being and not being has also an important function in theories of induction as its fundament and as a criterion to classify the

different types of inference Cf. A. B. Keith, *Indian Logic and Atomism*, pp. 111–122; S. Chatterjee, *The Nyāya theory of knowledge*, pp. 247–250.

11 Among the most important presuppositions of Indian thought we have the *saṃsāra* (see F. Tola and C. Dragonetti, 'Saṃsāra, anāditva y nirvāṇa', *Boletín de la Asociación Española de Orientalistas*, Vol. XV, Año 1979, pp. 95–114) the *anāditva* (see F. Tola and C. Dragonetti, '*Anāditva* or beginninglessness in Indian Philosophy', *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute*, Poona, 1980, Vol. LXI, Parts I–IV, pp. 1–20), and the *bījas* (*saṃskāras, vāsanās*) (see Jiryo Masuda, *Der individualistische Idealismus der Yogācāra-Schule, Versuch einer genetischen Darstellung*, Heidelberg: O. Harrassowitz, 1926, Materialien zur Kunde des Idealismus, 10. Heft, pp. 30–40).

12 In the original we have the word *gzugs* which corresponds to the Sanskrit *rūpa*. *Gzugs, rūpa* indicate the object of the visual cognition, fundamentally the form and the colour under which things come before us. We have translated *gzugs* by 'form'. 'Interior form' signifies in this passage the visual representations to which birth is given through the actualization of the (visual) virtualities, that is to say one of the classes of knowable interior forms which produce the cognition. But we must understand that what Dignāga says in relation to the visual interior form must be applied also to the other knowable interior forms, like taste sensations etc., and that what he says in relation to the eye must be applied also to the other sense organs like the ear etc.

13 According to the oldest Buddhist teaching the cognition's act comes forth depending on several factors. So *Śalistambasūtra* says: "*In this way the eye-consciousness* (cakṣur-vijñāna) *comes forth through five causes. Which five? Through the eye, the form, the light, the space and the attention produced by the former ones the eye-consciousness comes forth*" (p. 15, N. Aiyaswami Sastri (ed.), Adyar: Adyar Library, 1950). Dignāga sustains also that for producing the cognition it is necessary to have several factors, but in his opinion those factors are only two: The (visual etc.) virtuality and the interior form. Eye is nothing else than the visual virtuality or, in other words, eye is a specific form of virtuality as the other sense organs also are.

14 Dignāga deals in a very brief way with the problem of the place in which remains the virtuality which is actualized into a cognition. We must relate this passage with the discussion, which took place in the different Buddhist schools, in reference with the place in which the *bījas*, seeds, virtualities, left by all human act, are preserved. See L. de la Vallée Poussin, 'Note sur l'Ālayavijñāna', *Mélanges Chinois et Bouddhiques*, Bruxelles, 1934, 3, pp. 145–168; É. Lamotte, 'Le traité de l'acte de Vasubandhu', *Mélanges Chinois et Bouddhiques*, Bruxelles, 1936, 4, Introduction. Dignāga indicates two alternatives: the virtualities remain either in the consciousness (cf. Hiuan Tsang, *Tch'eng wei che louen, Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi, Taisho* XXXI, 1585, p. 8, a, 11–12 = L. de la Vallée Poussin, *La Siddhi de Hiuan Tsang*, Paris: Geuthner, 1928–29, p. 101), more properly in that aspect of consciousness that was called '*ālayavijñāna*' (that is to be compared in some way with the concept of subconsciousness in modern psychology) or in 'its own indefinable form'. We must understand this expression in the meaning: 'in itself'.

Dignāga says that the own form (or essential nature) of the virtuality is 'indefinable' (*bstan du med pa* in Tibetan, *anirdeśya* in Sanskrit), that is to say that, although we cannot doubt about the existence, activities and effects of the virtuality, we cannot say anything about its nature.

15 The important thing for the birth of a cognition is that the virtuality be actualized into the form of a visual cognition etc.; the place where the virtuality remains does not affect the knowledge's process.

[16] *Dmigs kyis ma phye ba* in the original. Sastri translates: *undifferentiated from the perceivable object* in his English translation (p. 54) and *ālambanād avibhaktam* in his Sanskrit reconstruction (p. 7). Yamaguchi: *mais encore non discerné* (avivṛta) *par l'object percevable* (ālambana), and Frauwallner: *durch einen Anhaltspunkt* (ālambana) *nicht bestimmt*. We have translated *ma phye ba* by 'not produced'. Cf. Lokesh Chandra (1961). *Tibetan Sanskrit Dictionary*, Kyoto: Rinsen Book Company, 1976, p. 1569 under *phye ba*.
[17] On *anāditva* see our article quoted in note 11.

NOTES FOR THE TIBETAN TEXT

[18] deḥi yul: *Peking*. *Sde-dge*: de yul.
[19] śes pas: *Peking*. *Sde-dge*: śes pas gaṅ gyis.
[20] rdul phra mo dag ni: *Peking*. *Sde-dge*: rdul phra mo dag gi ni.
[21] rgyuḥi dṅos po: *Peking*. *Sde-dge*: rgyu.
[22] ḥdor pa med do: *Peking*. *Sde-dge*: ḥdor bar byed do.
[23] reg na: *Peking*. *Sde-dge*: ni reg la.
[24] ḥdi ltar gtan tshigs dag ni yod pa daṅ med pa dag gi de daṅ ldan pa ñid ni: *Peking*. *Sde-dge*: ḥdi ltar gtan tshigs yod pa daṅ med pa dag ni yod pa daṅ med pa dag gi de daṅ ldan pa ñid na.
[25] rgyu daṅ rgyu daṅ ldan pa: Vinītadeva, *Sde-dge* and *Peking*. *Sde-dge*: rgyu daṅ ldan pa.
[26] don du snaṅ ba: *Peking*. *Sde-dge*: don du snaṅ bas.
[27] byed paḥi: *Peking*. *Sde-dge*: byed par.
[28] brten nas: *Peking*. *Sde-dge*: brten na.
[29] nus pa ni: Vinītadeva, *Sde-dge* and *Peking*. *Sde-dge*: nus paḥi.
[30] dus: according to Dignāga's Commentary, *Sde-dge* and *Peking*, the *Ālambanaparīkṣā-kārikā*, *Sde-dge* (4205) and *Peking* (5703), and Vinītadeva, *Sde-dge* and *Peking*. *Sde-dge*: du.
[31] ma phye ba: *Peking*. *Sde-dge*: ma bstan pa.
[32] rnam par śes pa: Vinītadeva, *Peking*. *Sde-dge*: rnam par śes pas.
[33] rnam pa ñid du: *Peking*. *Sde-dge*: rnam pa ñid.
[34] rnam pa las: Vinītadeva, *Sde-dge* and *Peking*. *Sde-dge*: rnam pa la.
[35] yul ñid du ḥthad do: *Peking*. *Sde-dge*: yul du mthod do.
[36] mdsad pa rdsogs so: *Peking*. *Sde-dge*: mdsad paḥo.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Catalogue = *The Tibetan Tripitaka, Peking Edition – Kept in the Library of the Otani University, Kyoto*. D. T. Suzuki (ed.), *Catalogue and Index*, Tokyo: Suzuki Research Foundation, 1962.

Nanjio = Nanjio B. (1883). *A Catalogue of the Chinese translation of the Buddhist Tripitaka, the Sacred Canon of the Buddhists in China and Japan*, San Francisco: Chinese Materials Center, 1975.

Peking = *Peking* edition = *The Tibetan Tripitaka, Peking Edition*, Compiled and edited by D. T. Suzuki and S. Yamaguchi, Tokyo: Suzuki Research Foundation, 1955–1962.

Sde-dge = *Sde-dge* edition = photocopies provided by Harvard Yenching Institute, Harvard University.
Taisho = *Taishō Shinshu Daizōkyō* (*The Tripiṭaka in Chinese*). J. Takakusu and K. Watanabe (eds.), Tokyo: The Taishō Shinshu Daizōkyō Kanko kai, 1970.
Tōhoku = *A Complete Catalogue of the Tibetan Buddhist Canons Bkaḥ-ḥgyur and Bstan-ḥgyur*, H. Ui, M. Suzuki, Y. Kanakura, and T. Tada (eds.), Sendai, Japan: Tōhoku Imperial University-Saitō Gratitude Foundation, 1934.